Canada, not wanting to design an SSN from the keel up, would buy existing hull and nuclear propulsion technology designs and build them under license in Canadian shipyards.
Three potential sources, the U.S., the United Kingdom (U.K.), and France, were to be considered. Defense, led by OSD with participation of the JCS and Navy, was of the view the proposal threatened a wide range of U.S. security interests. Although the NPT did not proscribe "nonexplosive military nuclear uses," i.e., nuclear propulsion, and although Article 14 of the NPT Safeguards Agreement permits the withdrawal of nuclear materials from NPT safeguards inspections for those purposes, Defense believed that a damaging precedent would be set because no nation since the Treaty had entered into force (a period of 20 years) had ever exercised that provision. Defense was also mindful of the unsafeguarded nuclear programs of Brazil and Argentina that were being officially justified by nuclear submarine development but which Defense feared would also move them to a "near nuclear weapon capability." Moreover, the Soviets had recently transferred a "Charlie-class" SSN to India (referred to in DOD as a "Chernobyl-class" because of many operational problems) and the The Navy did not believe the Canadian-operated TRAFALGARs could perform adequately against increasingly superior Soviet submarine technology such as the titanium hulled "Alpha-class" which they would encounter in coming decades. In addition to the dispute over territorial waters, the Navy particularly wanted to avoid the possibility of having to conduct combined submarine operations under the Arctic. In short, it wanted to preserve the condition that it had always enjoyed,--knowing that apart from its own subs, all unknown submarine contacts under the arctic ice would be Soviet.
The Department of Energy interests were more institutional.
As a consequence of the development of American nuclear propulsion led by Admiral Rickover, the responsibility for naval nuclear reactor development is shared between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Navy and resides in an organization in DOE known as "Naval Reactors." As with the submarine arm of the Navy (the "Silent Service"), Naval Reactors is one of the least known and most closed organizations of the U.S. government.
Protected by congressional committees, personnel of Naval
Reactors are the nuclear high priests of DOE who hold tightly to their nuclear crown jewels--highly classified nuclear technical know-how--which they zealously guard against any release which could narrow the margin with the Soviets.
It is not surprising then that the strongest opposition to the U.K.-Canadian SSN deal within DOE came from Naval Reactors, which wanted no part of any nuclear propulsion transfer deal.
For DOE the issues were simple. For Canada to build SSN's, large amounts of sensitive classified nuclear propulsion technology would have to be transferred to the Canadian government and industry. The question was would it be protected? Second, Canada did not have the critically important technology infrastructure which Naval Reactors knew was necessary for the safe application of naval nuclear propulsion. Their greatest concern, one shared by all in DOE and DOD, was that a reactor accident aboard a Canadian SSN using U.S.-design nuclear technology could severely damage public confidence in the safety of all nuclear vessels, severely curtailing the operational freedom and port access of the U.S. Navy, 40% of whose vessels were nuclear.
THE DECISION
Against this backdrop of issues it is interesting to note that, as far as anyone in the bureaucracy knows, no formal decision memorandum for the President was ever prepared; agencies were simply asked to submit their formal views on the proposal in writing to the White House. Shortly after Mr.
Reagan's decision was announced, however, it was revealed that the President's decision had been influenced by a personal letter he had received from Mrs. Thatcher which urged his approval. The decision had been handed down, and the only remaining expectation of the bureaucracy was, in the parlance of the Navy, "...to make it so."
THE NEGOTIATIONS
The revision of the 1957 U.S./U.K. Mutual Defense Agreement, an important first step in implementing the President's decision, was conducted with some difficulty. The British view was that the technology had greatly changed over the 30 year period, and they were openly resentful of continued U.S. 
